

fixed as the reality – the accepted facts, the known events, the shared truths – also constitutes the experiential and cognitive limit of the inquirer, marks the boundaries of the hitherto known world, and the nature and quality of social interaction. And what is called reality coincides with the place and time in which the practice of reflexivity gets suspended” (p. 265).

Just as the keyword of Thurston Moore’s album is not so much “Rock’n’roll” as “consciousness”, so the keyword of Giovan Francesco Lanzara’s text is not “practice”, “technology” or “innovation” but rather “reflection”. And reflection (like music) is never-ending.

\* \* \*

### **Bruno Latour**

*Piccola filosofia dell’enunciazione (con una nota di Jacques Fontanille)*  
[*Tiny Philosophy of Enunciation (with a note by Jacques Fontanille)*], Roma, Aracne, 2017, pp. 68

### **Alvise Mattozzi** *Free University of Bozen-Bolzano*

Providing an autonomous format to Bruno Latour’s 1999 article “Piccola filosofia dell’enunciazione” [Tiny Philosophy of Enunciation] with both the original French version and the already published one in Italian, was the right move. Now that some years have passed since the publication of *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (AIME)* (Latour 2013), it can result extremely useful to have at hand one of the sources, and one of the steps towards, *AIME*, in order to better understand and appreciate Latour’s trajectory in its entirety.

This new version of Latour’s article is accompanied by a useful afterword – in Italian and in French – by French semiotician Jacques Fontanille – “Dagli atti di enunciazione ai modi di esistenza” [*From acts of enunciation to modes of existence*] (pp. 43-52 and pp. 53-63). In such afterword, Fontanille clarifies the closeness and the distance between Latour’s proposal and the original theory of enunciation, from which Latour draws, in order to track and describe the relations giving way to different modes of existence.

“Piccola filosofia dell’enunciazione” (PFE; Latour 1999) has been initially published in a festschrift dedicated to Paolo Fabbri, semiotician who introduced Latour to semiotics and with whom Latour signed his first science studies article. Fabbri, who is now the director of the Centro Internazionale di Studi Semiotici [International Center for Semiotic Stud-

ies] of Urbino, has decided to republish it within the book series of the Center, in order to give visibility to the relevance enunciation had in this first version of Latour's system of "modes of existence" or "regimes of enunciation".

In PFE, Latour indeed explores, for the first time in a general systematic way, the descriptive and comparative possibilities of the enunciational model developed within Greimassian semiotics and already used by Latour in more focused studies of science, technological artifacts, religion and law that have led to *AIME*.

As Fontanille underlines in the final part of his afterword (p. 49 and p. 60), in between PFE and *AIME*, Latour discovers the French philosopher of modes of existence Etienne Souriau, thus replacing "regimes of enunciation", concept that appears in PFE, with "modes of existence". Consequently, in *AIME* acts of enunciation do not prime anymore and "enunciation", though not absent, is replaced by "instauration", another concept proposed by Souriau. For Fontanille such "ontological turn" is problematic not only because puts semiotics – which has had a key role in Latour's construction – in the shade, but especially because puts into the shade, behind existences, signification processes (semiosis) and the sensitive experience, which, for Fontanille, are directly connected to enunciation intended as production of signification (p. 45 and p. 55).

Since the first formulation of the concept by French linguist Emile Benveniste, theories of enunciation have been elaborated in order to tackle the articulation of the relations between what is in a sentence or in a text and the situation of its production or of its reception. Greimas and his collaborators have proposed a general model of enunciation in order to describe and analyze these relations and their various shiftings, not only for verbal language, but also for gestures, images, artifacts, etc.

Since at least the end of the '80s, Latour has found Greimas' model very useful in order to account for acts of mediations, or "sending" or "delegation" or "passing" (pp. 10 and pp. 26). Such model is articulated in three basic instances:

1. the enunciation, or "pass" for Latour
2. the enunciate, or message or "what is passed", the "quasi-object" in the case of Latour, in which traces of the enunciation can be tracked
3. the relation between an enunciator (3a), the sender, or "who/what passes", and an *enunciatee* (3b), the receiver, "to whom/to which is passed".

This last relation is mediated not so much by the enunciate, the message, like it would be in communication models, but by the enunciation, by the pass.

Besides these instances, the Greimassian model, and hence the Latourian's one, considers two main dynamics: disengagement (shifting-out) and (re)engagement (shifting-in). In the first case something – an

enunciate for Greimas, a quasi-object, for Latour – is produced, given existence or “instaurated”, by detaching it from the enunciation; in the second case, there is a return to 3), the relation between the enunciator and the *enunciatee*.

Latour, by exploring the combinatorial possibilities of the previous features, tracks and describes nine “regimes of enunciation”, which make up the blueprint for the first nine “modes of existence” of the fifteen considered in *AIME* – mind that the names chosen for these first nine “regimes of enunciation” described in PFE are not always the same used for the first nine “modes of existence” described in *AIME*, although their configuration is basically the same.

In PFE, Latour starts by considering “regimes” that do not exploit all the instances: “Reproduction”, in which a being (enunciator) passes itself; “Substitution”, in which there are only passes without termini, nor quasi-objects; “Omission” or “Belief”, in which only the quasi-object takes pass, without basically any pass.

Then, Latour considers those “regimes” that present a full-fledged articulation of the three instances: “Technique”, in which the quasi-object is completely disengaged from the relation between enunciator and *enunciatee*; “Fiction”, in which there is a disengagement of the delegates of the enunciator and the *enunciatee* and their world in a quasi-object; “Science”, in which, alongside the disengagement of “Fiction”, a complete reengagement, up to the relations between the enunciator and the *enunciatee*, is required.

Finally, Latour considers those “regimes” which are more concerned with the relations between enunciator and *enunciatee*, the quasi-subjects: “Politics”, through which a collective “we” is disengaged and reengaged; “Religion” or “Love”, in which continuous reengagements toward the enunciator or the *enunciatee* are carried out, producing an effect of extreme presence; “Law”, which is concerned with the multiplication of the marks left by the traces of the enunciation. They allow connecting the quasi-object to various enunciations.

As Fontanille notices (p. 44 and p. 54), Latour’s way of working is intrinsically semiotic. Nevertheless, Fontanille criticizes Latour for not being as radical as semiotics, i.e. for not completely discarding metaphysics and Being, something Latour could have done by focusing only on the “the stream of existence” (p. 44 and p. 54, my translation).

However, what Latour does is exactly this. By considering being (in lowercases in *AIME*) always as being-as-other, he tackles it only in “alteration”, only as the result of multiple streams of becoming other. Given that, as also Fontanille acknowledges (p. 45 and p. 55, my translation), “alteration” is the only ground needed for semiosis to take place, it seems to me that also the second criticism Fontanille makes, about Latour forgetting signification processes in *AIME*, lapses. Latour, indeed, extends signification processes to all modes of existence, something that he ex-

plicitly says in *AIME*: “a sign [as] something that stands in place of something else [...] remains a very general property that could define all types of senses and meanings, even the invisible beings that we have learn to capture in order to sketch the trajectories of being” (Latour 2013, 254).

By reading the dialogue at distance between the two French scholars we can then see various misunderstandings unfolding, which allow assessing the mismatch that today exists between Greimassian semiotics (or, at least, Fontanille’s version of it) and Latour’s ANT. Such mismatch stems from the different philosophical backgrounds of the two scholars: phenomenology for Fontanille; pragmatism for Latour.

I deem that the value and interest of republishing PFE does not reside so much in the fact that a reference to semiotic categories is more explicit there than in *AIME* or that in PFE Latour is more attentive to meaning processes – which, as we have seen, are relevant also in *AIME*. The value and interest of republishing PFE resides, instead, in the fact that by its conciseness and by the consequent continuous reference to the enunciational model, PFE clearly shows Latour’s method of inquiry. The latter is the product of the same descriptive methodology he has always used, which is grounded in semiotics: a set of categories, forming what he calls an “infra-language”, that are “first of all negative [...] [and] do not designate what is being mapped, but how it is possible to map” (Latour 2005, 174). Through these categories, in this specific case provided by the Greimassian enunciational model, he is able to map the way in which certain beings circulate by passing from one situation to another. Thus, Latour’s classification has nothing substantive and the various “regimes of enunciations” Latour is able to track and describe do not have anything to do with fields or social systems as, for instance, those outlined by Pierre Bourdieu or Niklas Luhmann, although some of their names could allow such analogy. Simplifying, I could say that Latour’s one is an operation that takes into account only the syntactic level, leaving the semantic one to the situated enactments of the actors. Therefore, it radically differs from the way Luhmann, for instance, singles out social systems, on the base of semantic dichotomies like legal/illegal or possession/non-possession.

*Piccola filosofia dell’enunciazione (con una nota di Jacques Fontanille)* is a must-read for those interested in *AIME*, in Latour’s thought or in Actor-Network Theory as a material semiotics and it could result stimulating for anyone interested in understanding how to describe and analyze complex relations, given the reflections the book provides on this matter, through both Latour’s and Fontanille’s contributions.

## References

- Latour, B. (1999) *Piccola filosofia dell’enunciazione*, in P. Basso and L. Corrain (eds.), *Eloqui de senso. Dialoghi semiotici per Paolo Fabbri*, Genova, Costa & Nolan, pp. 71-94.

- Latour, B. (2005) *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Latour, B. (2013) *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

\* \* \*

### **Tiago Morera**

*Science, Technology and the Ageing Society*, London and New York, Routledge, 2017, pp. 240

### **Roberto Lusardi** *University of Bergamo*

In this book, Tiago Moreira makes an interesting operation. He takes the concept of ageing – not exactly part of the most popular STS vocabulary – and then breaks it into its parts and analyses the processes connected using the STS gaze. Recalling a metaphor always effective (and dear to the STS world), he “opens the black box” of ageing and the book witnesses what he found.

First, Moreira says that ageing is not just a demographic, medical, or economic concern. It is a repertoire of practices and an institutional setup that the author calls “ageing society”. He makes clear his interpretative proposition: that the ageing society “is first and foremost a collective predicament, a swelling uncertainty concerning how to deploy procedures of scientific research and technological innovation in addressing ageing as an issue” (p. 1).

As STS scholars know very well, every collective predicament, every controversy – regardless of whether it concerns political, environmental, or health issues – implies sociotechnical arrangements, expert knowledge, power relations, and economic interests. The demographic data is not secondary, of course. The United Nations set the threshold of population’s sustainability to 7% of people being 65 or older in any given country. In Italy, according to the last ISTAT report on the national population, the percentage of people being 65 or older has overcome that mark by far and is at 22%.

The same phenomenon is affecting all the so-called Western nations, albeit in different percentages. This means that the demand for healthcare services and funding of health insurance is increasing, as are the pressures on systems of formal care and on processes of informal care within families and communities. Finally, the demographic trend affects the political and cultural attitudes of society, which tend to become more